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CHALLENGING THE CHALLENGE: TWELVE YEARS AFTER 
BATSON, COURTS ARE STILL STRUGGLING TO FILL IN THE 
GAPS LEFT BY THE SUPREME COURT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The client is an Arabian terrorist, and his attorney wants to 
strike all Jews from the jury. The client is an accused rapist, and his 
attorney intends to eliminate all women from the jury. The client is 
OJ. Simpson, and his attorneys hope to seat as many African-
American jurors as possible. 
Every attorney seeks to select a jury that will favor the client. I 
Many attorneys believe that a case can be won or lost during the 
jury selection stage of the triaI.2 Therefore, considerable amounts of 
time and money may be spent on efforts to shape the jury.3 Both 
sides will use every weapon available. 
The peremptory challenge-the elimination of a potential jury 
member without cause4-is one of the most powerful weapons an 
'1. See Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Rnles of the 
Jury, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1041, 1088-89 n.188 (1995)(noting that, although the pur-
pose of voir dire is to seat an impartial jury, "in practice" each side is looking 
for a sympathetic decision-maker). 
2. See Robert B. Hirshorn & Heather R. Epstein, How to Conduct a Meaningful & 
Effective Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 659, 68~1 (1992) (explain-
ing that a good trial attorney puts "as much energy into the selection of a 
jury as he or she does in the presentation of the case, because he or she real-
izes that he or she can put on the best play in the world, but without an audi-
ence that is receptive to the play, it will be misunderstood and not compre-
hended"). 
3. See Jim Goodwin, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal Behavioral 
Cues to Deception to Strike Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 ARIz, L. REv. 739, 739-40 
(1996) (indicating that an entire industry, composed of "sociologists, market 
researchers, and communications experts," exists to help the attorney select a 
jury); Debra Sahler, Scientifically Selecting Jurors While Maintaining Professional Re-
sponsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 383, 386 (1996) (ob-
serving that the use of trial consultants is no longer limited to multi-million 
dollar cases). 
4. See BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (defining peremptory chal-
lenge as "the right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required 
to assign, a reason for the challenge"). But see, e.g., ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN 
SONSTENG. ADvOCACY: JURY TRIALS § 1.61, at 57 (1994) (maintaining that, al-
though no reason need be given, an attorney may not strike a juror based on 
race or some other protected class). 
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attorney can use during the jury selection process.5 The primary 
goal of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate all prospective ju-
rors who appear partial to the other side.6 The peremptory chal-
lenge allows an attorney to dismiss those venirepersons without pro-
viding a reason.1 However, the unrestrained use of peremptory 
challenges was curtailed by the Supreme Court in Batson v. 
Kentucky.8 
This Comment discusses the struggle to fill the gaps left by the 
Batson decision. Part II provides background information regarding 
the jury selection process,9 peremptory challenges,1O and the Equal 
Protection Clause. I I Part III provides an overview of the decisions 
leading up to Batson,12 followed by a discussion of Batson and its 
progeny.13 The procedures and remedies formulated in Batson are 
analyzed generally in Part IY.I4 Part V reviews the Batson procedures 
and remedies as Maryland courts apply them. 15 Part VI discusses the 
present standing of peremptory challenges and makes recommenda-
tions for their future use in the jury selection process. 16 This Com-
ment concludes that despite a lack of direction, the Batson chal-
lenge is a necessary tool to eliminate discrimination in the jury 
selection process. 17 
5. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYsTEM AND 1HE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
RACY 131 (1994) (explaining that peremptory challenges allow attorneys on 
both sides to rid a jury of biased or prejudiced people). 
6. See HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 11.4.3, at 457-58 (2d ed. 
1993). 
7. See VALERIE O. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING 1HE JURY 67 (1986) (noting that 
attorneys who believe jurors will view their side disfavorably use their preemp-
tory strikes to eliminate such jurors when they are not dismissed for cause). 
8. 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause is violated 
when a prospective juror is excluded because of race). Prior to Batson, prose-
cutors were able to exclude jurors who shared the defendant's race without 
any constitutional limitations. See Cynthia Richers-Rowland, Batson v. Ken-
tucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HAsTINGS LJ. 1195, 1195 
(1987). 
9. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text. -
10. See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 74-100 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 101-82 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 183-264 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 265-342 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 343-58 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 359-73 and accompanying text. 
1999] Twelve Years After Batson 381 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Jury Selection Process 
The selection of a jury is a multi-step process intended to com-
port with the requirements of the Constitution and the American 
judicial system. 18 It involves the creation of a source list from which 
prospective jurors will be drawn, the voir dire questioning of pro-
spective jurors,19 the elimination of biased jurors through challenges 
for cause,20 and the elimination of other objectionable jurors 
through peremptory challenges.21 The first step is the selection of a 
pool of prospective jurors from a source list.22 At the federal district 
court level, prospective jurors may be selected from voter registra-
tion lists or from lists of actual voters within the district or divi-
sion.23 In addition to voter lists, other sources of names may be 
used24 to ensure a random selection from "a fair cross section of 
18. See, e.g., Juli Vyverberg, Note, The Peremptory Challenge: Substance Worth Preserv-
ing?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 435, 437-38 (1994) (" 'It is part of the established tradi-
tion in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be truly 
representative of the community.' " (quoting Smith v .. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 
(1940»). Although the Constitution does not require that the jury be per-
fectly representative of the surrounding community, it does forbid the system-
atic exclusion of" 'distinctive groups in the community.' " [d. (quoting Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1975». According to at least one commenta-
tor, ajury comprised of a representative cross section of the community "is an 
essential component of the Sixth Amendment." [d. at 437 (citing Taylor, 419 
U.S. at 528); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing all criminal defend-
ants the right to an "impartial jury"). It is through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that the Sixth Amendment applies to the States. 
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (extending the protections 
of the Sixth Amendment). 
19. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 3940 and accompanying text. 
21. For a comprehensive discussion of peremptory challenges, see infra notes 41-
57 and accompanying text. 
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(a)-(b) (1994) (providing that the clerk shall maintain a 
jury wheel and from time to time as required, publicly draw names of persons 
to be assigned to jury panels). 
23. See id. § 1863(a),(b)(2) (providing that each federal district court shall devise 
a plan for random jury selection that shall, among other things, specify 
whether the names of jurors shall be selected from voter registration lists). 
24. See id. § 1863(b)(2) (providing that if necessary to foster the policy and pro-
tect the rights prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 and 1862, other sources may 
be used, including the city directory in the District of Columbia and the resi-
dent list in the district of Massachusetts). 
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the community,"25 and to prevent exclusion on the basis of "race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. "26 
The majority of states follow the federal approach and use state 
voter lists as a source for pooling prospective jurors.27 Other states 
use alternative sources in addition to or in lieu of voter lists.28 These 
alternative sources include "a local census, the tax rolls, city directo-
ries, telephone books, and drivers' license lists."29 A minority of 
states follow the key-man system.30 The key-man system authorizes 
political and civic leaders to suggest prospective jurors.31 
The next step in the jury selection process is the voir dire ques-
tioning of prospective jurors. During voir dire, the prospective ju-
rors are questioned to determine their biases.32 The federal system 
provides two methods for questioning jurors.33 Thus, on the federal 
level, the court will either conduct the voir dire itself or will allow 
the parties or attorneys to question the jurors.34 The manner in 
25. [d. § 1861 (setting forth the policy of the United States that all litigants shall 
have the right to a jury selected at random). 
26. [d. § 1862 ("No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit ju-
ror in the district courts of the United States ... on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."). 
27. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 963 (2d ed. 
1992) (noting that lists of voters are the most commonly used method). Mary-
land adheres to the federal approach. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. '& JUD. PROC. § 
8-202(2) (1998) (providing that the jury selection plan shall specify proce-
dures for the jury commissioner to select names from "voter registration lists 
or from other sources as are necessary"). 
28. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 963. 
29. [d. 
30. See id. (approximating that one-third of the states, all of which are located in 
New England and the South, use the key-man system). 
31. See id. Some commentators have argued the key-man system should be invali-
dated because its subjectivity "invites abuse" and "invidious manipulation." See 
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 184 (1997) (concluding that the 
Supreme Court should invalidate the key-man system due to its subjectivity 
and expense). 
32. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.10, at 48 (explaining that under the 
voir dire process, jurors are challenged to establish a fair and impartial jury). 
33. See id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (discussing voir dire rules in criminal 
cases); FED. R. Cw. P. 47(a) (discussing voir dire rules in civil cases). 
34. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.10, at 48 (noting that when the 
court does the questioning, the court must permit attorneys to supplement 
the inquiry by such additional questions "as it deems proper or shall itself 
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or 
their attorneys as it deems proper") (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a); FED. R. 
Cw. P. 47(a)). 
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which voir dire is conducted in state courts varies from state to 
state.35 The attorneys rely on voir dire responses to determine 
whether or not to strike the juror.36 
The last two steps in the jury selection process involve the elim-
ination of jurors through challenges.37 There are two primary types 
of challenges-a challenge for cause and a peremptory challenge.38 
A challenge for cause is directed at a prospective juror who is objec-
tionable for a particular reason.39 1'0 establish a challenge for cause, 
the attorney must show that the juror's sympathies or prejudices are 
such that it would be impossible for that juror to be impartial.40 
When the attorney wishes to remove a juror, but is unable to estab-
lish a challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge is often used.41 
B. The Use and Importance oj Peremptory Challenges 
The peremptory challenge is the direct opposite of a challenge 
for cause.42 The peremptory challenge allows each party to elimi-
nate prospective jurors from the jury panel without establishing 
35. See id. The authors note that (1) in approximately 13 states, the examination 
is done by the judge only, (2) it is done primarily by attorneys in 18 states, 
and (3) the responsibility is shared by judge and attorney in the remainder. 
See id. Maryland follows the federal approach permitting either the parties or . 
their attorneys to conduct the questioning, or permitting the court to ques-
tion the jurors itself. See MD. R CIv. P. 2-512(d) ("[T]he court may permit the 
parties to conduct an examination of jurors or may itself conduct the exami-
. nation after considering questions proposed by the parties."); MD. R CRIM. P. 
4-312(d). 
36. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.10, at 51 (providing that after jurors 
have been examined, the parties can exercise peremptory and for cause chal-
lenges). 
37. SP.e id .. 
38. See id. § 2.11, at 51. A third type of challenge, a challenge to the array, is used 
when a party alleges that there was an irregularity in summoning or selecting 
the jury. See id. In Maryland, a challenge to the array is expressly recognized. 
See MD. R CN. P. 2-512 (a); MD. R CRIM. P. 4-312(a). 
39. See HAYDOCK & SoN5rENG, supra note 4, § 1.53, at 48. A challenge for cause 
may be based on actual bias, which is present when the prospective juror for-
mulates an opinion regarding the case, the parties, or the witnesses at voir 
dire. See id. at 48-49. A challenge for cause may also be based on implied bias, 
which is present when the juror has an existing relationship with any of the 
attorneys, parties, or witnesses. See id. at 49. 
40. See id. § 1.54, at 49 (explaining that a mere statement by a juror that he or 
she is biased or prejudiced is not enough to establish cause to strike, but that 
the jurors' answers must indicate an inability to be impartial). 
41. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1197. 
42. See HAYDOCK & SONsrENG, supra note 4, § 1.53, at 48, § 1.61, at 57. 
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cause.43 Unlike a challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge 
does not require the court's approval.44 Exercise of the peremptory 
challenge is solely the prerogative of the attorney4s-no reason or 
explanation for striking the prospective juror is required.46 The 
strike can be based solely on the attorney's hunch or intuitive belief 
that the prospective juror is unlikely to render a favorable verdict.47 
The peremptory challenge performs the valuable function of 
increasing the parties' power to choose who will sit in judgment 
over them.48 Some believe that skillful exercise of the peremptory 
challenge will help the attorney select a more impartial jury.49 
Others view it as a tool to manipulate the outcome of a trial.so A 
challenge for cause involves the difficult tasks of identifYing juror 
bias and proving that bias to the judge.51 These difficulties are eased 
by the peremptory challenge because the attorney is allowed to re-
move a potentially biased juror without establishing cause.S2 
Much of the potential for abuse is explained by the very lim-
ited information upon which attorneys exercise their strikes.s3 An at-
43. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131. 
44. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT· 
MENT TO REPRESENTATNE PANELS 145 (1977). 
45. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 67. 
46. See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 4, § 1.61, at 57; see also Kirk Pittard, With-
standing Batson Muster: What Constitutes a Neutral Explanation?, 50 BAYLOR L. 
REv. 985, 985 (1998) ("The peremptory practice allows litigants to strike po-
tential jurors for reasons based purely on instinct and intuition, reasons which 
may not be amenable to articulation." (citing Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 
867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992»). 
47. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 76 (questioning the effectiveness of attor-
neys in their attempts to create a favorable jury). 
48. See id. at 72 (noting that the defendant's ability to strike jurors that appear bi-
ased may help the defendant accept the verdict as reasonable). 
49. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131 ("In theory, peremptories are justified as 
tools for fashioning impartial juries, used by both sides to eliminate 'extremes 
of impartiality.' "). 
50. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that several manuals advise 
lawyers to "[llook for jurors whose minds can be molded, who will not resist 
your arguments, and who are not expert in the matters of the current case"). 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. This information is typically limited to the juror's name, occupation, 
and physical characteristics. See id. An informal telephone survey of jury com-
missioner offices in Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Anne Arundel 
County indicates that the information given to Maryland attorneys includes 
the juror's name, occupation, spouse's occupation, and level of education. See 
MD. R. Civ. P. 2-512(c); MD. R CRIM. P. 4-312(c). 
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torney's decision to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror may 
rest on a remark made during voir dire, a questionable glance, or 
the juror's clothing.54 Likewise, some have noted patterns by prose-
cutors to strike prospective jurors who share the same genetic, 
socio-economic, religious, or national background as the defend-
ant.55 Trial experts have gone so far as to advise young lawyers to 
base their selections on stereotypes.56 This advice is grounded on 
implied assumptions that jurors are "incapable of doing justice 
across group lines, that jurors always favor their own kind. "57 
C. Equal Protection and the Jury Selection Process 
The Supreme Court has increasingly relied on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause58 to ensure that all individuals are treated fairly in 
the exercise of their rights.59 The Equal Protection Clause applies to 
government actions that classifY individuals for different treatment 
under the law.60 An equal protection analysis examines whether the 
54. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131-32. 
55. See id. at 132 (noting that the success of this tactic relies on the presumption 
that jurors will favor parties that resemble them). Many also believe that a ju-
ror's demographic and socio-economic characteristics will influence that ju-
ror's verdict in a particular case. See id. at 143. 
56. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 73 (discussing the types of jurors favored 
and disfavored by trial tactic manuals). 
57. ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 131-32. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 
(1984) (concluding that if prosecutors are allowed to exercise peremptory 
challenges based on the assumption that African-American jurors would auto-
matically favor defendants of their race, the Equal Protection Clause " 'would 
be but a vain and illusory requirement' ") (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 
U.S. 587, 598 (1935»; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) 
(Frankfurter, j., dissenting) (commenting that a person's race "is unrelated to 
his fitness as a juror"). 
58. The Equal Protection Clause provides: No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
59. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.1, at 5 (2d ed. 1992). The right to fair or 
equal treatment requires that the government "treat each individual with 
equal regard as a person." LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 
§ 16-1. at 1438 (2d ed. 1988). 
60. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 59, § 18.1, at 4 ("The equal protection' 
guarantee ... governs all governmental actions which classify individuals for 
different benefits or burdens under the law."). Equal treatment may be de-
nied when a government classification distinguishes between persons who 
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government classification is based on impermissible criteria or 
places an arbitrary burden on a particular group.61 In some in-
stances, the express requirements of the law will establish a ques-
tionable government classification.62 In other instances, the law will 
not establish a questionable classification by its own terms, but it 
will be applied in an impermissible manner.63 
When the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause are at is-
sue, the Supreme Court examines the constitutionality of govern-
ment classifications using three standards of review.64 The first stan-
dard of review for an equal protection analysis is the rational 
relationship test.65 Under the rational relationship test, the Supreme 
Court limits its analysis to whether the government classification has 
a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.66 The Su-
should be viewed as "similarly situated." TRIBE, supra note 59, § 18.1, at 1438. 
Equal treatment may also be denied when the government fails to establish a 
classification for persons who should be viewed as "differently situated." Id. 
61'. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.2, at 7; see also Joseph S. Jackson, 
Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 24 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REv. 407, 456 (1997) (explaining that the legislature cannot draw 
classifications to disadvantage or burden a group); James J. Sing, Integration As 
a 1wo-Way Street, 108 YALE LJ. 479, 480-81 (1998) (discussing the impermissibil-
ity of a government standard that "burdens or grants preferential treatment" 
to certain groups). 
62. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.2, at 8; see also Therese M. Gold-
smith, Note, Hopwood v. Texas: The Fifth Circuit Further Limits Affirmative Action 
Educational Opportunities, 56 MD. L. REv. 273, 281-82 (1997) (providing that 
overt race-based classifications "must be viewed with skepticism") (citing 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 u.S. 200, 226-27 (1995»; Lisa White 
Shirley, Reassessing the Right of Equal Access to the Political Process: The Hunter 
Doctrine, Affirmative Action, and Proposition 209, 73 TuL. L. REv. 1415, 1422 
(1999) (describing racial classifications as an overt distinction based on race). 
63. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.2, at 8 ("[AJ law may have no 
impermissible classification by its own terms but it may be applied in such a 
way as to create a classification."); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the 
Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, 1,1uality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical 
Analysis of "Neutral Theory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'y 243, 284 n.46 (1999) (pointing out that the legislature may pass a 
law without intending to discriminate or may not realize that a statute will 
burden a particular group); Shirley, supra note 62, at 1422 (discussing that a 
facially neutral law may nonetheless have a disproportionate impact on minor-
ity groups). 
64. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 14. 
65. See id. 
66. See id.; see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
("The general rule is that legislation is presumed valid and will be sustained if 
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preme Court has applied the rational relationship test to govern-
ment classifications that stem from social and economic legislation.67 
The second standard of review is the strict scrutiny test. Under 
the strict scrutiny test, the Supreme Court raises the level of its re-
view and independently determines whether the government classifi-
cation is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government in-
terest.68 The Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny test to 
two types of classifications: (1) classifications that affect a person's 
ability to exercise a fundamental constitutional right69 and (2) classi-
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest."); see also Kathleen A. Graves, Comment, Affirmative Action in Law 
School Admissions: An Analysis of Why Affirmative Action is No Longer the An-
swer . .. Or is It?, 23 S. ILL U. LJ. 149, 166 (1998); Julie M. Riewe, Note, The 
Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,47 DUKE LJ. 117, 127 (1997) (pointing out that a 
law will be upheld if it passes the rational relationship test and if it does not 
burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class); Jerald W. Rogers, Note, 
Romer v. Evans: Heightened Scrutiny Has Found a Rational Basis-Is the Court Tac-
itly Recognizing Quasi-Supsect Status for Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals?, 45 U. KAN. 
L. REv. 953, 957-58 (1997). 
67. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (observing that the Equal Protection Clause al-
lows states wide latitude on social and economic legislation); see also Graves, 
supra note 66, at 574 (arguing that a rational basis review gives legislatures 
deference in instituting social policy); Helen Herschkoff, Positive Rights and 
State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 
1131, 1153 (1999) (discussing the rational relation test in the context of wel-
fare legislation); Peter J. Longo, The Human Genome Project's Threat to the 
Human Constitution: Protections From Nebraska Constitutionalism, 33 CREIGHTON L. 
REv. 3, 9 (1999) (" [I]f a statute involves economic or social legislation not im-
plicating a fundamental right or suspect class, courts will only ask whether 
[there is] a rational relationship [to a legitimate government interest]."). 
68. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 15; see also Kevin F. Clarkson 
et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 
ALAsKA L. REv. 213, 249 (1999) (discussing the types of cases to which the 
strict scrutiny test applies); Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, When Si-
lence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49 
DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 73 (1999) (discussing the application of the strict scrutiny 
test to religious freedom cases); Linda N. Deitch, Comment, Breaking News: 
Proposing a Pooling Requirement For Media Coverage of Live Hostage Students, 47 
UCLA L. REv. 243, 298 (1999) (arguing that a content-based ban on speech 
would have to pass a strict scrutiny test). 
69. See Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Com-
pound Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REv. 333, 386 (1998); Gret-
chen Witte, Comment, Internet Indecency and Impressionable Minds, 44 VILL. L. 
REv. 745, 777 (1999) (arguing that a restriction on children's Internet access 
involves two fundamental rights-parental child rearing authority and free-
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fications that make distinctions using a "suspect" basis.70 
The third standard of review is the intermediate test, which is a 
middle ground between the strict scrutiny test and the rational rela-
tionship test.71 Under the intermediate test, or heightened scrutiny 
standard of review, the government classification must have a sub-
stantial relationship to an important government interest.72 The Su-
preme Court has used the intermediate test for classifications involv-
ing gender and illegitimacy.73 
dom of speech-and must therefore withstand strict scrutiny). 
70. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 15. According to the Court, 
"[t]he general rule gives way" when the government uses suspect classifica-
tions such as "race, alienage, or national origin." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. For 
a description of the general rule, see supra note 66. See also Darlene C. Gor-
ing, Affirmative Action and the First Amendment: The Attainment of a Diverse Stu-
dent Body is a Permissible Exercise of Institutional Autonomy, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 
591, 596 (1999) (noting that classifications that are considered suspect are 
usually race based); Brian Privor, Dusk Til Daum: Childrrn's Rights and the Effec-
tiveness of Juvenile Curfw Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REv. 451, 492 (1999) (arguing 
age is not a suspect class) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976»; Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An 
Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. LJ. 
1787, 1814-21 (1992) (discussing suspect classes). 
71. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 17 ("The Supreme Court 
has adopted an intermediate standard of review that is not as difficult for the 
government to meet as the compelling interest test, but which involves far less 
deference to the legislature than does the rationality test."). 
72. See id.; see also John P. Cronan, Subjecting the Fourth Amendment to Intermediate 
Scrutiny: The Reasonableness of Media Ride-Altmgs, 17 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 949, 
959 (1999) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate test 
in addressing Fourth Amendment issues surrounding media "ride-alongs" with 
law enforcement agents); Stacy Sulman Kahana, Crossing the Border of Plenary 
Power: The Viability of an Equal Protection Challenge to Title VI of the Welfare Law, 
48 DUKE LJ. 305, 339 (1997) (predicting the outcome of a welfare law chal-
lenge under each Equal Protection test); Yanet Perez, Note, Women Win the 
War at VMI, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 233, 234 (1997) (discussing the application 
of the strict scrutiny test to gender-based classifications). 
73. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.3, at 17. In Cleburne, the Supreme 
Court determined that mental retardation was not a classification that re-
quired more than the rationally related standard of review. See Cleburne, 473 
U.S. at 44042. But see Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Pr0-
spective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. 
L. REv. 289, 34243 (1993) (arguing that Batson should be extended to include 
classifications based on physical disabilities). 
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III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
A. fu-Batson Cases 
Generally, courts do not subject a law to any level of equal pro-
tection analysis unless a party demonstrates that the law classifies 
persons in some manner, including on the basis of race, alienage, 
national origin, gender, or illegitimacy.74 Historically, discrimination 
on the basis of race and gender has permeated the jury selection 
process.75 The promise of a non-discriminatory process began over 
100 years ago.76 In 1879, the Supreme Court examined discrimina-
tion in the jury selection process in Strauder v. West Virginia.77 The 
Strauder Court invalidated a state statute that solely permitted "white 
male persons who are twenty-one years of age" to serve as jurors.7~ 
Addressing the issue of whether a "colored man" could be fairly 
tried by a jury assembled with a discriminatory selection process,79 
the Court held that jury selection criteria discriminating against a 
group because of its color or race violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.so 
According to the Strauder Court, the purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was to "assure to the colored race the enjoyment of 
all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white per-
74. See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 59, § 18.4, at 41. 
75. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and,Race Discrimination: The Lost 
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REv. 140 I, 1406-07 (1983) (dis-
cussing the history of racial discrimination in the jury selection process); AB-
RAMSON, supra note 5, at 112-13 (discussing the historical discrimination 
against women as potential jurors). 
76. See Schmidt, supra note 75, at 1414 (referring to Strauder as a "lost promise" 
and providing a detailed discussion of its "strength and impotence"). 
77. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
78. See id. at 305. 
79. See id. at 305-06. Here, an Mrican-American man was indicted and convicted 
of murder by a jury solely comprised of white men. See id. at 305. The Court 
carefully defined the issue it was to address: 
[d. 
It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether a 
colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him, 
has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part 
of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether, in the composi-
tion or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all 
persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because 
of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man 
sit upon the jury. 
80. See id. at 310. 
390 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
sons. "81 The West Virginia statute effectively impeded the parity that 
the Equal Protection Clause sought to secure by denying a race the 
right to participate in the administration of justice.82 
A general proposition in Equal Protection jurisprudence is that 
a violation is established only upon a "showing of intentional or de-
liberate discrimination."83 It is easy to find intentional discrimina-
tion that violates the Equal Protection Clause when the state an-
nounces its racial exclusion, as the West Virginia legislature did in 
Strauder.84 However, proving intentional discrimination is more diffi-
cult when there is no express policy either on the statute's face or 
in the government's application.85 In the years following Strauder, 
the Supreme Court struggled with this problem.86 Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court tended to defer to the judgment of state courts 
and rarely overturned convictions of defendants making jury dis-
81. Id. at 306. 
82. See id. at 308. The Court observed: 
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every 
white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his 
own race or color,or, rather, selected without discrimination against 
his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the 
law with the former. 
Id. at 309. 
83. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 22.2(c), at 964. As declared by the Court: 
The mere fact of inequality in the number selected does not in itself 
show discrimination. A purpose to discriminate must be present 
which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of 
the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an 
extent as to show intentional discrimination. 
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945). 
84. See KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 171. 
85. See id. (noting the "huge volume of litigation" generated to determine the ex-
istence of purposeful discrimination where the government policy does not 
e'xpressly discriminate). See also JOHN G. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw § 14.4, at 621 (5th ed. 1995). A discriminatory classification 
for equal protection purposes can be established in one of three ways. First, 
the law may establish a classification "on its face," meaning that "the law by 
its own terms classifies persons for different treatment." Id. Second, a law may 
be challenged in its "application" -while imposing no classification explicitly 
on its face, the law may be administered in "different degrees of severity to 
different groups of persons who are described by some suspect trait." Id. Fi-
nally, while containing no classification and being applied evenhandedly, a 
"law may be challenged as in reality constituting a device designed to impose 
different burdens on different classes of persons." [d. 
86. See KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 175-76. 
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crimination claims.87 
Although Strauder involved a discriminatory statute rather than 
a discriminatory practice,88 it constituted the Supreme Court's foun-
dation for eliminating discrimination in the jury selection process.89 
In 1965, the Supreme Court first addressed the discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.90 However, the Swain 
Court failed to adopt a viable means of protecting the defendant's 
right to a fair and impartial jury, free from unscrupulous manipula-
tion by state prosecutors.91 
Swain involved an Mrican-American's conviction and sentence· 
to death by an all-white jury.92 The defendant, Robert Swain, ob-
jected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate 
Mrican-Americans from the jury.93 The Supreme Court held that 
87. See id. at 175 (characterizing the Supreme Court's deference as "unwar-
ranted"). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's 1880 through 1909 deci- .. 
sions in which defendants failed to establish the requisite discriminatory in-
tent, see ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 108-09. For a typical example of the 
Supreme Court's deference to state court fact-finding during this period, see 
Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 281 (1909). The Thomas Court explained: 
"[W] hether such discrimination was practiced in this case was a question of 
fact, and the determination of that question adversely to plaintiff in error by 
the trial court and by the [Texas] Court of Criminal Appeals was decisive." [d. 
at 282; see also Vyverberg, supra note 18, at 443 ("A particular problem with a 
trial court's acceptance of subjective demeanor is that it often insulates dis-
criminatory challenges from appellate review. Reviewing courts cannot observe 
the idiosyncratic behavior and body language of venirepersons, and thus, may. 
often unintentionally ignore illegitimate justifications given by prosecutors. "). 
88. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
89. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). 
90. 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965). 
91. See id. at 222-23. In fact, the Court adopted a presumption that a prosecutor's 
use .of peremptory challenges secured a fair and impartial jury. See id. at 222. 
Further, a showing that "all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they 
were removed because they were Negroes" did not overcome this presump-
tion. [d. 
92. See id. at 203. Robert Swain, a 19 year-old African-American, was convicted of 
raping a 17 year-old white girl. See id. at 231 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Only 
Justice Goldberg's dissent elucidated these facts. See id. (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing). 
93. See id. at 209-10 (noting that all six African-Americans were struck from the .. 
jury pool). In the county of the trial, three jury commissioners placed "all 
male citizens in the community over 21 who are reputed to be honest, intelli-
gent men and are esteemed for their integrity, good character and sound 
judgment" on the jury roll. [d. at 206 (citation omitted). The identities of 
these individuals were attained from sources including "city directories, regis-
tration lists, club and church lists, conversations with other persons in the 
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the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor systematically 
used peremptory challenges to discriminate over a period of time.94 
Without a clear showing of when, how often, and the relative cir-
cumstances of the prosecutor's discriminatory conduct, the defend-
ant would be unable to attack the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
strikes.95 Otherwise, the Court concluded, the long-lasting system of 
peremptory challenges would be undermined.96 
Legal scholars have criticized Swain for establishing an insur-
mountable evidentiary standard.97 Writing for the Supreme Court 
years later in Batson, Justice Powell recognized that a number of 
lower courts had interpreted the Swain standard to mean that the 
defendant must provide proof of the repeated exclusion of a minor-
ity group over several trials.98 Unfortunately, in the years following 
the Swain decision, few defendants were able to uncover sufficient 
details regarding a prosecutor's past jury panels and strikes to estab-
lish systematic discrimination.99 Therefore, it was virtually impossible 
community, both white and colored, and personal and business acquaint-
ances.» Id. (footnote omitted). Although the Court recognized that the jury 
selection process was haphazard and made little effort to include the African-
American community, it concluded that "an imperfect system is not 
equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race." Id. at 209 (footnote 
omitted). 
94. See id. at 227-28 (emphasizing that both prosecutors and defense counsel exer-
cise peremptory strikes). According to the Court, "[t]he ordinary exercise of 
challenges by defense counsel does not . . . imply purposeful discrimination 
by state officials.» Id. at 227. Therefore, unless the defendant sufficiently es-
tablished the prosecutor's participation, the mere absence of African-
Americans serving as jurors over a particular period of time would not "give 
rise to the inference of systematic discrimination on the part of the State.» Id. 
The Court eventually discarded the notion that discriminatory peremptory 
strikes by a criminal defendant would not constitute state action. See Georgia 
v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51-55 (1992). For a discussion of McCollum, see infra 
notes 158-72 and accompanying text. 
95. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (finding no evidence of prolonged use of race-based 
peremptory strikes on the record). However, it should be noted that African-
Americans constituted 26% of Talladega County, yet typically accounted for 
no more than 15% of the venire. See id. at 205. Additionally, no African-
American had served on a jury for fifteen years, even though an average of 
six or seven African-Americans were on individual petit jury venires in crimi-
nal cases during this time. See id. 
96. See id. at 221. 
97. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 134; KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 196. 
98. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). Justice Powell referred to the 
Swain evidentiary standard as "a crippling burden of proof. HId. 
99. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 27, § 22.3(d), at 979. Most courts did not keep 
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for a defendant to successfully attack discriminatory peremptory 
challenges. 100 
B. The Batson Decision 
Two decades after Swain, the Supreme Court lowered the evi-
dentiary standard established by the Swain Court in the landmark 
decision of Batson v. Kentucky.101 James Kirkland Batson, an Mrican-
American defendant, was convicted of second-degree burglary and 
receipt of stolen goods by an all-white jury.102 During the jury selec-
tion process, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to 
eliminate all four Mrican-Americans from the pool. 103 Before the 
jury was sworn, the defense attorney moved to discharge the jury, 
contending that the prosecutor had improperly removed Mrican-
American venirepersons. I04 Observing "that the parties were entitled 
to use their peremptory challenges to 'strike anybody they want 
to,' " the trial court denied the motion. 105 
The Batson prosecutor's peremptory challenges of potential ju-
rors reflected the perception that Mrican-Americans were incapable 
of impartiality in an action against a defendant of the same race. 106 
The Supreme Court declared that the Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibited peremptory challenges exercised on this assumption. I07 
Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further pro-
records reflecting the race of the prospective jurors, which party challenged a 
particular juror, or whether the challenge was made for cause or perempto-
rily. See Charles j. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discrimi-
natury Use of Peremptury Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1102 (1994). 
100. See ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 134 (observing that no federal court made a 
finding of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges during the two de-
cades following Swain). . . 
101. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
102. See id. at 82-83. 
103. See id. at 83. Under Kentucky law, the prosecutor had six peremptory chal-
lenges in total. See id. at 83 n.2. 
104. See id. The defense attorney argued that the prosecutor's unexplained removal 
of African-American jurors violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. See id. 
105. Id. 
106. This is the assumption courts make regarding the attorney's motives when a 
peremptory challenge raises the inference of discriminatory intent. See id. at 
101 (White, j., concurring). 
107. See id. at 97 ("The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that 
their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless 
were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of [the assumption 
that African-Americans would be biased toward other African-Americans, 
which arises] solely from race."). 
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ceedings to determine whether the facts established purposeful dis-
crimination. l08 The Supreme Court further stated that in the ab-
sence of a neutral explanation for th:e peremptory challenges, the 
defendant's conviction must be reversed. IOO Although the Court did 
not expressly rely on any of the three standards used in an equal 
protection analysis, I \0 the logical conclusion is that the constitu-
tional protection of suspect classifications, which are subject to strict 
scrutiny, will supersede the right to exercise peremptory 
challenges. III 
The Court's holding in Batson allows a defendant to establish a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination solely on the basis of 
peremptory challenges exercised in the defendant's trial, rather 
than requiring a demonstration of systematic exclusion over several 
trials. 112 After Batson, a prosecutor's actions and statements during 
voir dire and in the exercise of peremptory challenges could be 
used to infer a discriminatory purpose.113 Once the attorney oppos-
ing the challenge makes a prima facie showing of purposeful dis-
crimination, the attorney making the challenge would have to pro-
vide a neutral explanation for striking the juror. 114 
Rather than concentrating exclusively on the rights of the 
defendant, the Batson Court also discussed the impact of discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges on the surrounding community as a 
whole. ll5 As noted by the Batson Court, "[t]he harm from discrimi-
natory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant 
and the exCluded juror to touch the entire community."1l6 Aside 
from the threats to the defendant's Equal Protection rights, the 
Court recognized the considerable threat that discriminatory per-
emptory strikes pose to the public's confidence in the justice 
system. ll7 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. For a discussion of equal protection, see supra notes 58-73 and accompanying 
text. 
Ill. See Lynch, supra note 73, at 322-23. 
112. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95. 
lB. See id. 
114. See ill. at 98. 
liS. See ill. at 87. 
1I6. Id. 
1I7. See id. 
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C. Post-Batson Cases 
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson has substantially im-
pacted the exercise of peremptory challenges. The peremptory chal-
lenge is no longer a true challenge without cause. When an attor-
ney believes that opposing counsel has stricken a prospective juror 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the attorney may make 
a Batson challenge-a motion challenging the removal of the ju-
ror. 1I8 Moreover, the Supreme Court has extended the reach of the 
Batson challenge in subsequent cases. 1I9 Decisions have been made 
regarding the use of the Batson challenge by white defendants, 120 
civil litigants,121 and prosecutors.122 Peremptory challenges on the 
basis of gender have also undergone examination by the Court. 123 
1. The Evolution of Batson Challenges 
a. Use by White Defendants 
In 1991, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a 
white defendant had standing to object to the prosecutor's peremp-
tory strikes of Mrican-American jurors in Powers v. Ohio.124 A white 
defendant, Larry Joe Powers, was convicted of murder and at-
tempted murder. 125 During voir dire, Powers objected to the prose-
cutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove seven Mrican-
American venirepersons. 126 However, there was no indication that 
race was a factor in the crime or the trial. I27 The trial court rejected 
each of the defendant's challenges without requiring the prosecutor 
118. See HAYDOCK & SONSTENG, supra note 4, § 1.62, at 59 (explaining that a party 
may challenge a peremptory strike exercised by an opposing party if the juror 
was struck on an unconstitutional basis). 
119. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1103 (observing that the Court has allowed the 
use of the Batson challenge when the defendant and juror are not of the 
same race, during jury selection in civil actions, and where the objection is 
made by the government). 
120. See infra notes 12446 and accompanying text. 
121. See infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text. 
122. See infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text. 
123. See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text. 
124. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
125. See id. at 403. He received a sentence of 53 years to life imprisonment. See id. 
126. See id. (commenting that each time the State used a peremptory strike to re-
move an Mrican-American juror, the defendant would make a Batson chal-
lenge). In all, the prosecutor exercised 10 peremptory strikes. See id. 
127. See id. (recognizing that the record did not reveal whether race was in some 
way implicated in the crime or trial). 
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to provide a neutral explanation. 128 
Again discussing the importance of the jury process to the com-
munity at large, much like in Batson,129 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the defendant did not have to be the same race as the 
excluded juror to make a Batson challenge. 13o The Court empha-
sized the contribution of jury service to community acceptance of 
legal institutions and the law, declaring that "with the exception of 
voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their 
most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic pro-
cess. "131 Although conceding that no individual juror has the right 
to sit on a particular jury, the Court emphasized that all citizens 
have the right to not be excluded solely on the basis of race. 132 
The Court further explained that the defendant had standing 
to raise a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. 133 Although the 
use of race-based peremptory strikes violates the rights of prospec-
tive jurors, the Court held that defendants-even though they are 
third parties-may challenge these discriminatory practices. 134 The 
Court noted that the similarity in interests between the defendant 
and the stricken juror, as well as the potential impact on the admin-
istration of justice during the trial, supports the defendant's right to 
enforce the rights of jurors. 135 The Court also relied on the practical 
roadblocks to equal protection challenges by venirepersons,136 com-
pounded by "little incentive to set in motion the arduous process 
needed to vindicate [their] own rights."137 
Thus, Powers allows the defendant to enforce the equal protec-
tion rights of the excluded juror.138 The Court also concluded that 
128. See id. 
129. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text. 
130. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991). 
131. [d. at 407. 
132. See id. at 409 ("Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or compe-
tence."). The Court also rejected the State's argument that race-based per-
emptory challenges survived equal protection analysis because they equally af-
fected all races, including whites. See id. at 410. The Court concluded that this 
approach "has no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence." [d. 
133. See id. at 415. 
134. See id. at 413. 
135. See id. at 413-15. 
136. See id. at 415 ("There exists considerable practical barriers to suit by the ex-
cluded juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic 
burdens of litigation."). 
137. [d. at 415 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953». 
138. See id. 
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race was irrelevant to the defendant's standing.139 According to the 
Powers Court: "To bar [Powers's] claim because his race differs from 
that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary ex-
clusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury ser-
vice."I40 This signified an expansion of the Batson decision, which 
had previously appeared to require that the defendant share the 
same race as the excluded juror. 141 
h. . Use by Civil Litigants 
To further preserve the integrity of the courtroom, the Su-
preme Court extended Batson challenges to civil litigants in Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete CO.142 Here, Edmonson filed a negligence suit 
against his employer for injuries sustained in a work-related acci-
dent. 143 When Leesville used peremptory challenges to remove two 
African-American jurors, Edmonson requested a race-neutral expla-
nation for the challenges. l44 The trial court denied the request, indi-
cating that Batson only applied to criminal cases. 145 
Prior to Edmonson, most charges of discrimination in the jury 
selection process involved the actions of prosecutors and other state 
officials in criminal cases. l46 This was mainly because of Batson's re-
liance on the Equal Protection Clause, which is limited to challeng-
ing state action. 147 In Edmonson, however, not only did the Court 
consider whether civil litigants could exercise racially motivated per-
emptory challenges,148 but the court also confronted the question of 
whether a civil litigant could be considered a government actor so 
as to satisfy the state action requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 149 
139. See id. 
140. [d. 
141. See id. at 420 (Scalia, j., dissenting). 
142. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
143. See id. at 616. 
144. See id. at 616-17. The plaintiff was also an Mrican-American. See id. 
145. See id. at 617. 
146. See id. at 618. The Court rejected the notion that it would allow discrimination 
in civil cases. See id. 
147. See id. at 619. 
148. See id. (" [D] iscrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury in a civil pro-
ceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal 
trial.") . 
149. See id. State action refers to an activity that is dominated by governmental au-
thority to the extent that it becomes subject to constitutional constraints. See 
id. at 620-22. The state action analysis is used to determine whether the consti-
tutional violation results from a state authorized right and whether the party 
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The Court determined that the mere availability of peremptory 
challenges constituted sufficient state action to invoke the Equal 
Protection Clause. ISO For this determination, the Court noted that 
peremptory challenges were only permitted when authorized by the 
government. lSI Without this governmental approval, the private liti-
gant would be unable to strike a juror on a discriminatory or any 
other basis. ls2 The Court further reasoned that the jury selection 
process, which includes the peremptory challenge system, is admin-
istered by the government. IS3 When civil litigants participate in the 
jury selection process, they assist the government in the important 
function of determining who will be the trier of fact.ls4 The Court 
also commented on the insidious nature of racially motivated per-
emptory strikes, concluding that the stigmatization and alienation 
decided in PowerslSS applied in equal force to the selection of jurors 
for civil trialS. IS6 Therefore, the Court held that discriminatory per-
emptory challenges were prohibited in civil, as well as criminal, 
cases. IS7 
c. Use by Prosecutors 
In Georgia v. McCollum,ls8 the Supreme Court extended Batson 
challenges even further by permitting prosecutors to demand race-
neutral explanations for a criminal defendant's use of peremptory 
strikes. IS9 In this case, three white defendants were charged with ag-
charged with the violation can be described as a state actor. See id. at 620 (cit-
ing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,939-42 (1982». 
150. See id. at 627. 
151. See id. at 620. The peremptory challenge exercised in Edmonson was authorized 
by a federal statute. See id. at 621 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994». 
152. See id. 
153. See id. at 622-24. The Court further noted: "[A] private party could not exer-
cise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the 
court. The government summons jurors, constrains their freedom of move-
ment, and subjects them to public scrutiny and examination." [d. at 624. 
154. See id. at 624-28. As the principal fact-finder, the jury weighs the evidence, 
judges the credibility of witnesses, and renders a verdict. See id. at 625. Ulti-
mately, the Court reasoned that the jury embodies the power of the court 
and the government. 
155. See supra notes 124-141 and accompanying text. 
156. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630. 
157. See id. ("Racial discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the 
proceeding is civil or criminal."). 
158. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
159. See id. at 59. 
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gravated assault and simple battery against two Mrican-Americans. l60 
Before the jury selection phase of the trial began, the prosecution 
moved to- restrain the defendants from using their peremptory chal-
lenges to discriminate against :prospective Mrican-American jurors. 161 
The trial court denied the prosecutor's motion. 162 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a criminal defend-
ant could not use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory man-
ner.163 The Court observed that the defendant's use of peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner harmed the excluded juror 
as well as the community at·large. '64 Reiterating the law's need to 
instill public confidence in :the courts, the Court reasoned that 
criminal defendants should no more be permitted to exercise dis-
criminatory peremptory strikes than civil litigants or prosecutors.165 
Moreover, the Court concluded that racially motivated strikes by a 
criminal defendant could be subjected to !i Batson challenge. '66 Al-
160. See id. at 44. 
161. See id. at 4445. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel had "indicated a 
clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminating manner." 
[d. at 45. Given the statistical composition of the area and the likely size of 
the venire, the prosecutor argued that counsel could strike all of the potential 
Mrican-American jurors with the 20 peremptory strikes available to the de-
fense. See id. 
162.' See id. The trial coun held that the law does not prohibit a criminal defend-
ant's use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. See id. 
163. Seeid. at 59 ("[T]he Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engag-
ing in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of per-
. emptory challenges.") .. In deciding whether the Constitution was violated, the 
Coun addressed whether: (I) a criminal defendant's racially motivated strikes 
causes the harms Batson was designed to protect; (2) a criminal defendant's 
peremptory strikes constitutes state action; (3) a prosecutor has standing to 
invoke a Batson challenge; and. (4) a criminal defendant's constitutional rights 
preclude the extension of Bats'an to the defendant's strikes. See id. at 48. 
164. See id. at 48-50 (addressing the harms protected by Batson). The Coun con-
cluded that when a juror is subjected to the public indignity of racial discrimi-
nation, the juror is harmed, regardless of who exercises the peremptory chal-
lenge. See id. at 49-50. According to the Coun, the community is harmed by 
the inevitable undermining of the integrity of the criminal justice system 
whenever the jury selection process permits attorneys to exclude potential ju-
rors on the basis of race. See zd. 
165. See id. at 49-50. 
166. See id. at 48-59. Relying on namonson, the Coun also determined that the exer-
cise of a peremptory challenge by a criminal defendant was a result of state 
action. See id. at 51-55 (discussing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614 (1991». For a discussion of Edmonson, see supra notes 142-57 and ac-
companying iext. Relying on Powers and Edmonson, the Coun also determined 
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though the Court recognized that criminal defendants have a right 
to an impartial jury, it found that this requirement did not mandate 
the availability of discriminatory peremptory strikes. 167 
However, the Court did observe that there was a distinction be-
tween peremptory challenges exercised to remove jurors who har-
bor racial prejudice and peremptory challenges exercised to remove 
jurors because of their race. 168 The Court recognized that given the 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury,169 a defendant has the 
right to remove jurors who "would be incapable of confronting and 
suppressing their racism."17o However, the Court concluded that 
peremptory challenges exercised simply because the venireperson is 
a particular race do not qualify under this right. 171 Indicating that 
the defendant must articulate a racially neutral explanation for the 
challenges if the State established a prima facie showing of a dis-
criminatory strike, the Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings. 172 
2. The Court Extends Batson to Include Gender-Based Peremptory 
Strikes 
In 1994, the Supreme Court increased the classes of individu-
als173 protected from discriminatory peremptory strikes by holding 
that prosecutors have standing to object to the violation of the excluded ju-
ror's constitutional rights. See id. at 55-56. For a discussion of Powers, see supra 
notes 124-41. 
167. See McCoUum, 505 U.S. at 57-58 (rejecting the defendants' argument that limi-
tations on peremptory strikes violated the attorney-client privilege, Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, and Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury). The Court noted that peremptory challenges 
are not a constitutionally-protected right. See id. at 57. The peremptory chal-
lenge is "but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial 
jury and a fair trial." Id. This "state-created means" may be withheld without 
violating the Constitution. See id. 
168. See id. at 59. The Court recognized that a defendant may sometimes need pro-
tection from jurors who cannot overcome their racism. See id. at 58. However, 
the Court rejected the belief that "assumptions of partiality based on race 
provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror." Id. 
at 59. 
169. For the relevant portions of this Amendment, see supra note 167. 
170. McCoUum, 505 U.S. at 58 (citations omitted). 
171. See id. at 59. 
172. See id. 
173. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not extended the grounds 
upon which Batson challenges may be made to all classifications requiring a 
strict scrutiny analysis. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) 
(Burger, J., dissenting) (" [I]f conventional equal protection principles apply, 
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that gender-based peremptory strikes also violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.174 The case, fE.R. v. Alabama ex rei. T.R.,175 involved a 
complaint against a male defendant for paternity and child sup-
port. 176 The State used its peremptory strikes to remove all male ju-
rors.177 The Supreme Court concluded that gender was an unconsti-
tutional basis for determining a juror's ability to render a fair and 
impartial decision,178 holding that "gender, like race, is an unconsti-
tutional proxy for jury competence and impartiality." 179 The Court 
noted that by allowing discriminatory peremptory strikes, the courts 
impermissibly sent a signal to society that "certain individuals, for 
no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state ac-
tors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons 
could disagree."18o Comparing the historical treatment of Mrican-
then presumably defendants could object to exclusions on the basis of not 
only race, but also ... age, ... religious or political affiliation, ... mental 
capacity, ... number of children, ... living arrangements, ... and employ-
ment in a particular industry, ... or profession." (citations omitted». For ex-
ample, in Minnesota v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993), een. denied, 
511 U.S. 1115 (1994), the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the aggra-
vated robbery conviction of a defendant who had challenged the State's sole 
peremptory strike. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d. at 768. Using the peremptory strike 
against an African-American, the prosecutor explained that the removal was 
due to the potential juror's beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, not because of his 
race. See id. The prosecutor argued that Jehovah's Witnesses are "reluctant to 
exercise authority over their fellow human beings" as members of a jury. [d. 
Refusing to overturn the defendant's conviction, the court commented that 
discrimination based ()n religion was not as "common and flagrant" as that 
based on race. See id. at 771. The Davis court also struggled to differentiate 
between a peremptory challenge based on a venireperson's religious beliefs 
and a challenge for cause based on a juror's reluctance to impose a criminal 
sanction. See id. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Batson challenges 
would be available on the basis of "age, occupation, education, or wealth be-
cause these are not classified as protected groups." Vyverberg, supra note 18, 
at 448 (citing Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985». 
174. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
175. 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
176. See id. at 129. 
177. See id. The trial court rejected petitioner's theory that Batson applied to gen-
der discrimination. See id. An all-female jury ordered him to pay child sup-
port. See id. The petitioner lost on appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Ap-
peals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of 
gender discrimination. See id. at 129-30. 
178. See id. at 146. 
179. [d. at 129. 
180. [d. at 142. Ironically, the fE.B. Court noted that in Strauder-the groundwork 
for equal protection guarantees in the courtroom-the Supreme Court "ex-
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Americans and women, the Court found no governmental interest 
seryed by perpetuating a judicial system that permits discriminatory 
~ peremptory challenges. lSI Thereafter, a Batson challenge could be 
made on the exercise of a gender-based peremptory strike. IS2 
IV. BATSON PROCEDURALLY 
A. A Prima Facie Case 
Understanding the gro\lnds on which a Batson challenge can be 
· made is only one dimension to raising a challenge at trial. In order 
· to properly raise a challenge, it is important for attorneys to under-
stand how to conduct a Batson challenge procedurally. An attorney 
· should be aware of when to make a Batson challenge and how to 
· defend peremptory strikes against a possible objection under Batson. 
Unfortunately, the Batson Court declined to adopt specific guide-
lines that would instruct attorneys and the lower courts as to how to 
implement its decision. ls3 Due to the variety of jury selection prac-
.. tices followed in state and federal courts, the Court decided not to 
attempt to instruct those courts as to how to implement Batson s 
· holding. 184 
However, the Supreme Court did announce a three-prong test 
for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. ls5 First, the 
· defendant must be a member of a cognizable group.IS6 Second, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor used peremptory 
. challenges to remove members of that group from the venire. 187 
pressed no doubt that a State 'may confine th.e selection [of jurors] to 
males.'" [d. at 131 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 
(1879». For a discussion of Strauder, see supra notes 77-87 and accompanying 
text. 
181. See fE.B., 511 U.S. at 135-39. Interestingly, however, the Court would permit 
peremptory challenges that have a disproportionate impact on one gender, 
absent a showing of pretext. See id. at 143 & n.16 (approving hypothetical per-
emptory strikes against individuals with military service and individuals em-
ployed as nurses) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991». 
182. See id. Maryland had rejected the use of gender-based peremptory challenges 
two years earlier. See Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1992). The 
court of appeals concluded that gender-based peremptory challenges were 
prohibited under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See id. at 270, 673 A.2d at 
653. 
183. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (deferring to the trial courts' 
ability to ensure that peremptory strikes are non-discriminatory). 
184. See id. at 99-100 n.24. 
185. See id. at 96. 
186. See id. (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977». 
187. See id. 
1999] Twelve Years After Batson 403 
Third, the defendant must show that the facts and circumstances of 
the case raise an inference that the peremptory challenges were 
used to exclude that group.188 Once the defendant satisfies these 
three requirements, the burden of production shifts to the propo-
nent of the peremptory strike. 189 The Batson Court's three-prong test 
contemplates an attack by a criminal defendant. Nevertheless, in 
light of the subsequent expansion of Batson to encompass attacks by 
civil litigants and prosecutors, the test is no longer limited to crimi-
nal defendants. l90 
The first two requirements for a showing of discrimination are 
relatively self-evident. 191 Generally, membership within a cognizable 
group and the exclusion of the group's members 'via peremptory 
challenges are easily discernible. 192 As a result, the first two require-
ments are not subject to wide degrees of interpretation. 193 However, 
it is much more difficult to discern an inference of discrimination 
from the facts and circumstances of a case. Therefore, the third re-
quirement has been subjected to a number of interpretations. 194 
An inference of discriminatory intent has been drawn from va-
rious circumstances. 195 For example, courts have considered whether 
the challenged juror shares membership in a cognizable group with 
a defendant, victim, witness, or attorney involved in the case. 196 
Courts have also considered the type and level of voir dire question-
ing and the juror's responses. 197 Challenges that remove all mem-
188. See id. 
189. See id. 
190. See supra notes 142-72 and accompanying text; see gmerally Christopher J. Scan-
lon, Casarez v. State: Texas Draws a Line in the Sand and &fuses to Extend Batson 
to &ligion-Based Peremptvry Challenges, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 233 (1997) (discussing 
the evolution of Batson). 
191. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1105-06. 
192. See id. at 1106. Courts have generally recognized that Batson applies to particu-
lar groups. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 679 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(noting that Hispanic persons are a cognizable group); United States v. Iron 
Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989) (identifying Native-Americans as a 
cognizable group) (citing United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th 
Cir. 1987»; United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 95-97 (2d Cir. 1988) (conclud-
ing that Italian-Americans are a cognizable group). 
193. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1105-06. 
194. See id. at 1106. 
195. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 2.13.4, at 13-15 (listing several kinds 
of evidence that demonstrate discriminatory intent). 
196. See id. at 14 (citing United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 
1989) (considering the race of the victim and witnesses». 
197. See id. at 13-14. 
404 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
bers of a cognizable group have been deemed improper. 198 In addi-
tion, a prima facie showing of discrimination may even be found 
where some members of a cognizable group are challenged for 
cause. 199 
B. The Requirement of a Neutral Basis for Challenge 
1. The Batson Standard 
Once an attorney establishes a prima facie case of a discrimina-
tory peremptory challenge, the proponent of tlle challenge must 
provide a neutral basis for the strike.2OO Unfortunately, the Batson 
Court failed to differentiate between the justifications that can over-
come the prima facie case and what justifications are merely pretex-
ual. 201 Facially neutral reasons for the peremptory challenge can eas-
ily be fabricated after a Batson challenge is made.202 In the absence 
of clear standards, the trial court is likely to accept almost any ex-
planation.203 Reasons that courts have accepted include failing to 
make eye contact,204 looking flirtatiously at the defendant,205 appear-
ing too eager to serve on a jury,206 and glancing favorably at the 
other side.207 The trial court's findings become problematic because 
the appellate courts defer to their determinations and only reverse 
if those determinations are "clearly erroneous. "208 
198. See id. at 13 (citing United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(noting that all Hispanic jurors had been challenged». 
199. See id.; see also United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1312 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that Batson was applicable to the peremptory challenge of the last 
Native-American juror, even though the other challenges of Native-American 
jurors had been for cause). 
200. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1107. 
201. See id. 
202. See id. (arguing that many courts accept explanations that are "after-the-fact 
rationalizations" made on "subconsciously racial grounds"). 
203. See id. (noting that trial court determinations are largely unreviewable because 
of the history of deference to state court findings and the heightened stan-
dard for reversal). 
204. See United States V. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
use of four peremptory strikes against minorities in the jury pool). 
205. See id. 
206. See Kelly V. Winthrow, 25 F.3d 363, 366-67 (6th Cir. 1994) (involving the per-
emptory strikes of seven Mrican-American jurors, two of which were stricken 
because they seemed too eager to serve). 
207. See Cooper v. State, 469 S.E.2d 790, 791-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (involving an 
Mrican-American defendant's use of 10 peremptory strikes to remove white 
jurors). 
208. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1107; see also Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 
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Some courts have accepted seemingly fabricated, "after-the-fact" 
explanations that are potentially driven by a discriminatory pur-
pose.209 For example, a prosecutor's assertion that the prospective 
juror had a bad attitude was deemed facially neutral, despite the 
fact that the prosecutor had used seven of his fIfteen peremptory 
challenges to strike Mrican-Americans.2Io 
Other courts have accepted explanations based on reasons that 
correlate to race.21l However, as announced by the Supreme Court 
in Hernandez v. New York,212 a party's peremptory strikes do not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause simply because the proffered justi-
fIcations have a disproportionate impact on a protected class.213 
During voir dire in an attempted murder trial involving a Latino 
defendant, a prosecutor struck all venirepersons with Latino sur-
names.214 In response to a Batson challenge, the prosecutor argued 
that the two bilingual venirepersons would not follow the inter-
preter's translation of testimony by Spanish-speaking witnesses.215 Al-
though the Court noted that "disparate impact should be given ap-
propriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with 
a forbidden intent, . . . it will not be conclusive in the preliminary 
race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry. "216 In regard to the prose-
cutor's race-neutral explanation, the Court declared: "Unless a dis-
criminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the 
reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. "217 The Hernandez Court 
701, 527 A.2d 332, 342 (1987) (explaining that a "reviewing court must pay 
great deference to" the trial court determinations). 
209. Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1107-08. Arguably, judges are reluctant to implicitly 
label an attorney a liar by rejecting that attorney's explanation. See Jose Felipe 
Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tradgedies in the Brave New 
World of Jury Sekction, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 343, 376 (1998) (discussing the ethi-
cal concerns raised by a procedure that requires a race-neutral explanation 
for the exclusion of a particular juror). 
210. See Zumbado v. State, 615 So. 2d 1223, 1232 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (explain-
ing that the prosecutor believed that the prospective juror may have had a 
"chip on her shoulder" regarding the judicial system). 
211. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1108 (listing reasons such as unemployment, liv-
ing in high crime areas, lower education, and failure to speak the English lan-
guage). 
212. 500 u.S. 352 (1991). 
213. See id. at 361. 
214. See id. at 355-56. 
215. See id. at 356. 
216. Id. at 362. 
217. Id. at 360. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, rejected this conclusion 
and asserted that "[a] n avowed justification that has a significant dispropor-
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accorded a great deal of deference to the trial court and affirmed 
the defendant's convictions.218 
The weight accorded to justifications that have a disproportion-
ate impact is no greater for peremptory strikes of African-American 
jurors. For example, the peremptory strike of a female African-
American juror on the basis of her unemployment and lack of edu-
cation was found to be facially neutral.219 Yet, there is a higher inci-
dence of unemployment and lower education in minority communi-
ties. 220 As a result, this "facially neutral" reason has a 
disproportionate impact on minority representation in juries.221 
2. The Purkett Standard 
Perhaps the most disturbing procedural development occurred 
in 1995, when the Supreme Court decided Purkett v. Elem.222 The 
Purkett decision appears to retreat from the evidentiary require-
ments of Batson.223 To rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination, 
the Batson Court required a "neutral explanation related to the par-
ticular case to be tried. "224 However, the Purkett Court indicated that 
tionate impact will rarely qualifY as a legitimate, race-neutral reason sufficient 
to rebut the prima facie case because disparate impact is itself evidence of dis-
criminatory purpose." Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
218. See id. at 364, 372. 
219. See United States v. Ross, 872 F.2d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 
government's theory that these factors indicated a "general lack of experience 
on the street, instability in life, and a smaller stake in the community" were 
sufficiently neutral). 
220. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
398 (1l7th ed. 1997). In 1996,4.7% of the white labor force was unemployed. 
See id. The 1996 unemployment rates for Hispanics (8.9%) and Mrican Amer-
icans (10.5%) were significantly higher. See id. The 1996 data also shows mi-
norities trailing in educational attainment levels. See id. at 160. For persons 
over age 25, 17.2% of whites, 25.7% of Mrican-Americans, and 46.9% of His-
panics lack a high school diploma. See id. . 
221. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1108; see also Pittard, supra note 46, at 999 (dis-
cussing the constitutionality of partially race-based peremptory strikes in a hy-
pothetical medical malpractice case in which a doctor misdiagnosed a case of 
sickle-cell anemia). 
222. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam). 
223. See id. at 770 (Stevens, j., dissenting) (arguing that the second step of the 
three-step process articulated in Batson has been lessened from a specific, neu-
tral explanation to use of an incredible explanation or a mere denial of an 
improper motive). 
224. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). The Purkett Court argued that this 
passage did nothing more than prevent the challenged attorney from "sat-
isfy[ing] his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discrimi-
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this "neutral explanation" did not have to be persuasive or 
plausible.225 
The facts of Purkett illustrate the danger inherent in this low-
ered standard. In this case, the defendant was on trial for second-
degree robbery.226 The prosecutor argued that an African-American 
juror's long hair and facial hair rendered him an unfit juror.227 • 
Rather than asking whether the given justification was plausible, the 
Court emphasized that the trial court must first concentrate on 
whether the justification was facially race-neutral.228 Therefore, the 
prosecutor's strike was upheld because a member of any race may 
grow long hair, a beard, or a mustache.229 Such reasoning could 
render future Batson challenges useless.230 However, the ultimate im-
pact of Purkett will depend upon whether state courts choose to fol-
low its standard. 
For example, in People v. jamison,231 the California Court of Ap-
peals refused to follow Purkett, invoking the protections of the state 
constitution.232 In jamison, the defendants were African-Americans, 
and the prosecutor excluded the only African-American juror with a 
peremptory challenge.233 The only explanation offered by the State 
was the juror's purported avoidance of eye contact with the prosecu-
tor.234 The jamison court declared that without more, the trial court 
natory intent or merely by affirming his good faith." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769. 
225. See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. The Purkett Court indicates that a neutral reason 
that is "silly or superstitious" does not end a Batson inquiry. See id. If the pro-
ponent of the challenge gives any neutral reason for the challenge, the judge 
must proceed to the next step in the Batson inquiry, which is to determine 
whether or not there has been purposeful discrimination. See id. at 767. At 
that point, but not before, the persuasiveness of the reason becomes relevant. 
See id. at 768. 
226. See id. at 766. 
227. See id. 
228. See id. at 769. 
229. See id. 
230. See id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that without further evidence, 
"some implausible, fantastic, and silly explanations" could overcome Batson 
challenges). 
231. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
232. See id. at 686. 
233. See id. at 682. 
234. See id. The prosecutor believed that the juror's behavior indicated an unwill-
ingness to serve on the jury and that she was disinterested in the events in 
the courtroom. See id. The State also attempted to argue that she exercised 
her peremptory strike because the venireperson had no prior jury experience. 
See id. at 683. The trial court rejected this justification, commenting that other 
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could not uphold the prosecutor's use of the peremptory strike.235 
The court referred to Purkett as a "digression from prior federal law 
prohibiting" discriminatory peremptory challenges.236 The court 
concluded that California's constitution and prior case law required 
its trial courts to demand a "race neutral, reasonably specific, and 
trial related" explanation.237 
When the proponent of a Batson challenge must rely upon the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution, 
state courts may likewise chip away at Batson. For example, the Ne-
vada Supreme Court accepted Purkett's lead in Washington v. State.238 
At trial, the court denied a Batson challenge to the prosecutor's use 
of a peremptory strike to remove the only Mrican-American male in 
the venire. 239 Adhering to Purkett, the Washington court indicated 
that a court did not have to require a persuasive or plausible expla-
nation.24O The court concluded that there was no discriminatory in-
tent in the prosecutor's strike on the basis of the prospective juror's 
job, education, or lack of children.241 Therefore, the court affirmed 
the trial judge's ruling.242 
C. Remedies for a Batson Violation 
Once identifying a Batson violation, the trial court must then 
implement an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court mentioned 
two possible remedies for a Batson violation established before the 
trial begins.243 However, while the trial court must carefully apply ei-
ther solution, each has its individual benefits and pitfalls. 
As suggested by the Batson Court, one remedy is to call for a 
new jury venire.244 Once a party removes a venireperson for discrim-
inatory reasons, the representative panel is destroyed.245 To this end, 
members of the venire also likely lacked experience as jurors. See id. 
235. See id. at 686. 
236. See id. 
237. [d. (refusing to follow the Purkett majority because California law, not federal 
law, controlled the disposition of the case). 
238. 922 P.2d 547 (Nev. 1996). 
239. See id. at 549. 
240. See id. (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 u.s. 765, 768-69 (1995». 
241. See id. 
242. See id. (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the 
objection to the peremptory challenge). 
243. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 u.s. 79, 99-100 n.24 (1986). 
244. See id. at 99-100 n.24. 
245. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1220 ("[TJhe venire is no longer repre-
sentative of the community after minority jurors have been stricken."). 
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some view calling for a new venire as a necessary remedy.246 A num-
ber of jurisdictions require this solution.247 Jurisdictions that require 
this remedy usually focus on the impartial jury and fair cross-section 
principles rather than the rights of the excluded juror.248 
Unfortunately, rather than dissuading parties from using per-
emptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, the possibility of a 
new jury venire may act as an incentive for using peremptory chal-
lenges in a discriminatory manner. Sometimes the attorney does not 
like the venire as a whole and may prefer a new jury venire.249 
Therefore, with a few improper strikes, the attorney could effec-
tively get rid of the entire venire.250 
A second remedy suggested by the Batson Court is to reinstate 
improperly excluded jurors.251 This remedy has also been adopted 
by several states.252 Under an equal protection analysis, the discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges violates both the defendant's 
and excluded juror's constitutional rights.253 The defendant's equal 
protection rights are violated by the exclusion of potential jurors 
who are members of the same cognizable group as the defendant.254 
246. See id. 
247. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 765 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the ve-
nire must be dismissed after a Batson violation and the jury selection process 
will begin over again with a different venire); Minniefield v. State, 539 N.E.2d 
464, 466 (Ind. 1989) (finding error where the trial court failed to grant a mis-
trial after the prosecutor failed to give a racially neutral explanation for strik-
ing potential jurors); State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159 (N.C. 1993) 
(concluding that the selection of a new jury is the remedy for a Batson viola-
tion). 
248. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1220-21. 
249. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory 
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 178 (1989). 
250. See id. (opining that a prosecutor in violation of Batson would gain a victory 
for his unlawful jury selection tactics). 
251. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100 n.24 (1986) (citing United States v. 
Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 474 (Conn. 1976». 
252. See, e.g., Ellerbee v. State, 450 S.E.2d 443, 448 (Ga. 1994) (holding that a trial 
court has the power to seat a juror determined to have been challenged in vi-
olation of Batson); Conerly v. State, 544 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1989) (con-
cluding that where there is no racially neutral reason for a strike, the trial 
court must seat the juror); State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 416 (Mo. 1993) 
(" [T]he prop~r remedy for discriminatory use of peremptory strikes is to 
quash the strikes and permit those members of the venire stricken for dis-
criminatory reasons to sit on the jury if they otherwise would."). 
253. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87 (discussing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 
(1880». 
254. See id. at 86. 
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The equal· protection· rights of the excluded juror are violated be-
cause each juror has the right to participate in jury service, regard-
less of race or other group membership.255 Reinstatement of the ex-
cluded juror corrects the violation of the defendant's and excluded 
juror's equal protection rights by reversing the peremptory chal-
lenge. Therefore, reinstatement of the excluded juror appears to be 
the required remedy under an equal protection analysis.256 
Furthermore, the potential reinstatement of an excluded juror 
is a strong incentive for avoiding discriminatory challenges because 
the jury may no longer be impartial once an excluded juror has 
been reseated. Therefore, an attorney who knows that an improp-
erly challenged juror may be reseated will pay more attention to his 
or her peremptory challenges.257 Reinstatement would encourage at-
torneys to examine their conscious and unconscious motives for dis-
crimination before making a peremptory challenge against a mem-
ber of a cognizable groUp.258 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits, there is a disadvantage 
to the reinstatement of an excluded juror. The reseated juror may 
suspect that the challenge was discriminatory and harbor hostility 
against both the attorney who made the challenge and that attor-
ney's c1ient.259 The potential for destroying the impartiality of the 
jury as a whole limits the effectiveness of this remedy. 
Weighing both the positive and the negative aspects of each 
remedy, the trial court is ultimately in the best position to deter-
mine which remedy is most . appropriate to the case at hand.260 One 
commentator suggests that no matter what remedy the trial court 
chooses for a Batson violation, its solution should further two 
goals.261 First, the remedy should persuade attorneys not to make 
discriminatory challenges.262 Second, the remedy should punish the 
attorney who chooses to make an improper challenge.263 No matter 
255. See id. at 87 ("A person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.' ~ 
(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)(Fr,mk-
furter, J., dissenting»). 
256. See Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1221. 
257. See id. 
258. See id. 
259. See id. 
260. See sU/ffa note 208 and accompanying text. 
261. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1116-17, 1122-23 (discussing a number of pro-
posed remedies for Balson violations). 
262. See id. at 1116-17. 
263. See id. at 1113-23. 
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which solution is pursued, appellate courts will afford trial courts 
great deference.264 
V. BATSON IN MARYLAND 
A. System for Exercising Peremptory Challenges 
As in most jurisdictions, the system for exercisin:g peremptory 
challenges in Maryland is governed by rule and statute.265 Mter voir 
dire, the court identifies potential jurors who have qualified to be 
seated on the jury. The attorneys for each side are then allowed to 
exercise a statutorily defined number of peremptory challenges.266 
The number of available peremptory strikes varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. Most state courts provide parties with six per-
emptory strikes in both civil and criminal cases.267 Federal courts al-
low three peremptory challenges.268 In Maryland, each civil party 
may exercise four peremptory challenges, plus one additional chal-
lenge for each group of three or less alternate venirepersons.269 For 
purposes of determining the maximum number of peremptory 
strikes, multiple plaintiffs or defendants will be viewed as a single 
party, unless otherwise directed by the court. 270 
The peremptory challenges permitted in Maryland criminal 
cases vary with the severity of the possible sentence.271 For example, 
the defendant who may be subject to the death penalty may exer-
cise twenty peremptory challenges, whereas the State is granted a 
total of ten.272 In cases where a defendant faces a sentence of twenty 
years of imprisonment or greater, there are ten peremptory chal-
lenges at the disposal of defense counsel and five strikes available to 
the State.273 For sentences of less than twenty years, the defendant 
and the State are each permitted a maximum of four peremptory 
challenges.274 
264. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
265. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) ("Today in 
most jurisdictions, statutes or rules make a limited number of peremptory 
challenges available to parties in both civil and criminal proceedings."). 
266. See MD. R Cw. P. 2-512(h); see also MD. R CRIM. P. 4-313. 
267. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 7, at 67. 
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1998). 
269. See MD. R Cw. P. 2-512(h). 
270. See id. 
271. See MD. CODE ANN .. Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 8-301 (1998). 
272. See id. § 8-301(a). 
273. See id. § 8-301 (b). However, this provision does not apply to common law of-
fenses for which no specific remedy is' statutorily provided. See id. 
274. See id. § 8-301(c). 
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B. The Prima Facie Case 
Like other jurisdictions, Maryland has grappled with the prob-
lem of implementing the mandate of the Batson Court.275 Thus, Ma-
ryland courts rendered several important decisions that helped to 
establish guidelines for exercising and responding to Batson chal-
lenges.276 Essentially, the issues of establishing that a party is a mem-
ber of a cognizable group and whether that group has been the fo-
cus of peremptory challenges seem to be relatively straightforward 
concepts.277 Yet, like other jurisdictions, Maryland courts have re-
peatedly revisited the issue of what constitutes a cognizable group. 
In Mejia v. State,278 a criminal defendant on trial for the rape of 
a white woman alleged that the State struck the only potential juror 
identified as Hispanic in violation of Batson.279 Concluding that the 
defendant had established a prima facie case,280 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland set forth the criteria for determining when a per-
son is a member of a cognizable groUp.28I The court noted that vis-
ual observations are ordinarily acceptable as a basis for determining 
that a person is a member of a cognizable groUp.282 However, group 
275. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 469 S.E.2d 790 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Brashear v. State, 
90 Md. 709, 715, 603 A.2d 901, 903 (1992); Cudjoe v. Commonwealth, 475 
S.E.2d 821 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
276. See Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992) (holding that a prima fa-
cie case showing of fact for Batson purposes was established by the defendant's 
proffer that the stricken venireperson was the only Hispanic in the venire); 
Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988) (concluding that a prima 
facie case for discrimination had been established by the fact that the prose-
cutor had stricken the sole Mrican-American from the jury venire). 
277. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text. 
278. 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992). 
279. See id. at 527-28, 616 A.2d at 358-59. 
280. See id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 358. 
281. See id. at 535 n.8, 616 A.2d at 363 n.8 (explaining that the basis for concluding 
whether a person is a member of a particular ethnic or racial group should 
be established in detail in the record). The court did not address the ques-
tion of whether Hispanics constituted a cognizable group because of the Su-
preme Court's recognition of this class in Hernandez. v. New Yom. For a discus-
sion of Hernandez, see supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text. 
282. See Mejia, 328 Md. at 535, 616 A.2d at 362. The court noted that once a party 
suggests that a venireperson is a member of a cognizable group, it is the re-
sponsibility of the other party to object if this assertion is incorrect. See id. at 
537, 616 A.2d at 363 (likening silence to a tacit admission). The court of spe-
cial appeals had concluded that affirmative evidence, not an unchallenged 
statement, was required to establish each element of a prima facie case. See id. 
at 532, 616 A.2d at 361. 
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membership could also be based on non-visual observations, such as 
surnames and language.283 The excluded juror in Mejia had a Span-
ish surname and spoke Spanish.284 Therefore, according to the 
court of appeals, the defendant had established that the excluded 
juror was a member of a cognizable groUp.285 Moreover, the court 
determined that the effect of the exclusion of that juror was the 
elimination of all Hispanics from the jury.286 Therefore, the court of 
appeals concluded that the case should be remanded to give the 
prosecutor an opportunity to provide a facially neutral explanation 
for the strike.287 
The party making a Batson challenge has the burden of con-
vincing the trial court that intentional discrimination has oc-
curred.288 In Stanley v. State,289 the Court of Appeals of Maryland ex-
amined the facts and circumstances that would generate a prima 
facie showing of discrimination.290 The Stanley court considered two 
cases involving African-American criminal defendants-Clarence 
Trice and Michael Stanley.291 Each defendant had been convicted by 
a jury that was substantially or totally composed of white jurors.292 In 
both cases, prosecutors used peremptory challenges to exclude most 
or all African-Americans from the pool of prospective jurors.293 
In the trial of Trice, the jury convicted the defendant of bur-
glary, malicious destruction of property, and theft.294 There was only 
one African-American in the array of prospective jurors.295 The State 
used one of its peremptory challenges to eliminate that potential ju-
283. See id. at 535, 616 A2d at 362. 
284. See id. at 52~27, 616 A.2d at 358. 
285. See id. at 539, 616 A2d at 364 (observing that there was no expressed disagree-
ment with the proffer that the stricken venireperson was the only Hispanic in 
the jury venire). 
286. See id. 
287. See id. at 540-41, 616 A.2d at 365. At trial, the judge denied the defendant's 
Batson motion without asking for a neutral basis for the challenge from the 
State. See id. 
288. See Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 61, 542 A.2d 1267, 1272 (1988) 
(" [E]xamination of Batson and the Title VII cases has convinced us that the 
defendant has the ultimate burden of persuading the court there has been in-
tentional racial discrimination."). 
289. 313 Md. 50, 542 A2d 1267 (1988). 
290. See id. at 71-72, 542 A2d at 1277. 
291. See id. at 54, 542 A.2d at 1278. 
292. See id. 
293. See id. at 72, 81-82, 542 A2d at 1278, 1282. 
294. See id. at 81, 542 A2d at 1282. 
295. See id. 
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ror.296 The court of appeals held that when the State uses a peremp-
tory strike in a manner which insures that no Mrican-American ju-
rors will serve in a case involving an Mrican-American defendant, a 
prima facie case has been made under Batson. 297 
In the trial of Stanley, the jury convicted the defendant of sev-
eral offenses, including murder, and sentenced him to a period of 
incarceration.298 The State used eighty percent of its peremptory 
challenges to remove Mrican-Americans from the pool of prospec-
tive jurors,299 even though Mrican-Americans constituted less than 
twenty-five percent of the venire.300 The court of appeals held that 
there was a "legally mandatory rebuttable presumption" of discrimi-
nation in Stanley's case because the circumstances indicated that 
the State had disproportionately used peremptory challenges against 
a specific group. 30\ The case involved an Mrican-American defend-
ant, victim, and key State witnesses.302 In addition, none of the voir 
dire responses made the excluded Mrican-American jurors ripe for 
a prosecutorial challenge.303 It appears that unless circumstances in-
296. See iii. at 82-83, 542 A.2d at 1282. 
297. See id. at 87, 542 A.2d at 1285. 
298. See id. at 64, 542 A.2d at 1273. Throughout the trial, the State pursued a death 
sentence for the defendant. See iii. at 64, 542 A.2d at 1273-74. 
299. See id. at 72, 542 A.2d at 1278. 
300. See id. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. The jury that convicted the defendant included 
three African-Americans, or 25% of the jury. See iii. at 66-67,542 A.2d at 1275. 
301. Id. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. At trial, the prosecutor also argued that the 
defendant had not timely objected to the peremptory strikes by waiting to 
raise his Batson challenge until after the jury had been selected, but before it 
had been sworn. See id. at 68, 542 A.2d at 1276. Although the State conceded 
that the defendant had preserved the issue for appeal by objecting in a timely 
manner, the court nonetheless discussed the appropriate timing for a Batson 
challenge. See id. at 69-70, 542 A.2d at 1276. The court explained: 
A Batson objection is timely if the defendant makes it no later than 
when the last juror has been seated and before the jury has been 
sworn. By waiting, rather than objecting to the first and every subse-
quent strike of a black juror, a clearer picture of what the State is do-
ing may be seen; a pattern may form. 
Id. at 69, 542 A.2d at 1276. However, the court did note that if there is a ques-
tion as to the stricken venire person's membership in a cognizable group or if 
there is a possibility that stricken venire persons will not be available once dis-
missed, the better practice may be to bring the matter to the court's attention 
at an earlier time. See id. at 69 n.lO, 542 A.2d at 1276 n.lO. 
302. See id. at 73, 542 A.2d at 1278. The police officers and the other witnesses in-
volved were all white. See id. 
303. See id. Only two of the African-American venire persons against which the 
State exercised peremptory challenges indicated any response to the court's 
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dicate otherwise, the use of a highly skewed number of peremptory 
challenges against a cognizable group creates a presumption of dis-
criminatory intent.304 Therefore, the proponent of the challenges 
will have to rebut this presumption with a neutral explanation.305 
C. Neutral Basis 1m- Challenge 
Once the Stanley court determined that the defendants had es-
tablished a prima facie case, it remanded the cases and ordered the 
trial courts to conduct a hearing at which the State would be given 
an opportunity to explain its peremptory challenges.306 As mandated 
by Batson, once a prima facie case is made, the opposing counsel 
must provide a neutral explanation for the strikes.307 Although the 
explanation does not have to be equal to a challenge for cause, it 
must be more thana good faith denial of discrimination30R or an as-
sertion that the excluded juror would have been biased.309 The 
court had explicitly provided that the defendants be given an op-
portunity to "rebut" these justifications, so as to expose any pretex-
tual explanations.310 
During the hearing for the defendant Stanley, the trial court 
ruled that there was a race-neutral basis for the State's peremptory 
strikes;311 the court of special appeals heard the appeal from this 
ruling.312 The appeal is significant because the court of special ap-
peals discusses the types of evidence that may be used to reb,:!t a 
presumption of discrimination.313 
According to the court of special appeals;\~butting a presump-
tion of discrimination requires proof of acceptable criteria for mak-
ing the challenge.314 The court recognized that age, occupation, and 
preliminary questions. See id. In contrast, the State used peremptory chal-
lenges against two white venire persons that had expressed reservations about 
imposing a death sentence during the court's questioning. See id. 
304. S(,R id. 
305. See id. at 75, 542A.2d at 1279. 
306. See Stanley v. State, 85 Md. App. 92, 96-97, 582 A.2d 532, 534 (1990). 
307. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). 
308. See id. at 97-98. 
309. See id. ("[T]he prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of 
discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's 
race on the assumption . . . that they would be partial to the defendant be-
cause of their shared race."). 
310. See Stanley, 313 Md. at 80 n.16, 88, 542 A.2d at 1281 n.16, 1286. 
311. .Ye Stanley v. State, 85 Md. App. 92, 95, 582 A.2d 532, 533 (1990). 
312. See id. 
313. SrR id. at 105, 582 A.2d at 538; see also supra notes 200-205. 
314. S(,R Stanley, 85 Md. App. at 101, \05,582 A.2d at 536, 538. 
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demeanor were acceptable criteria.315 Such criteria must be estab-
lished by evidence from the jury selection process.316 Therefore, the 
attorney facing a Batson challenge must be able to reconstruct the 
circumstances of the jury selection process.3I7 
The ability to reconstruct the circumstances of the jury selec-
tion process becomes critical, and challenging, when the Batson in-
quiry is made after a lengthy trial, on appeal, or both. Memories 
fade with the passage of time, making it more difficult to accurately 
recall the events of jury selection.3I8 Therefore, the trial court 
should ordinarily conduct a Batson inquiry at the time the Batson 
challenge is made.319 However, the Court of Special Appeals of Ma-
ryland has held that a Batson inquiry is not per se unreliable merely 
because it is conducted after the trial is over.320 As long as parties 
have the ability to reconstruct the circumstances of jury selection to 
the satisfaction of the trial court, a post-trial Batson inquiry will not 
be automatic grounds for reversaJ.321 
There are a number of steps that an attorney can take to suc-
cessfully reconstruct the basis for a peremptory challenge. For ex-
ample, attorneys should take notes on the lists of potential jurors 
provided by the court during voir dire.322 Attorneys should also cre-
ate their own lists and make additional notes regarding the jurors 
they intend to strike.323 These lists and notations will enable attor-
neys to prove that their peremptory challenges were based on neu-
tral reasons.324 
D. Remedy after Showing a Batson Violation 
Maryland examined the appropriate remedies for Batson viola-
315. See id. at 101-06, 582 A.2d at 536-38. 
316. See id. at 100, 582 A.2d at 535. 
317. See id. at 97-100, 582 A.2d at 534-35. . 
318. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 u.s. 79, 133 n.12 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting) 
(" [I] t would be virtually impossible for the prosecutor in this case to recall 
why he used his peremptory challenges in the fashion he did."); see also Ford 
Motor Co. v. Wood, 119 Md. App. 1, 28, 703 A.2d 1315, 1328 (1998) (involving 
a defendant who argued that after a four-week trial, "memories were not as 
fresh"). 
319. See Ford Motor Co., 119 Md. App. at 28, 703 A.2d at 1328. 
320. See id. at 29, 703 A.2d at 1328. This holding is grounded in the fact that Mary-
land courts have "remanded cases to trial courts for Batson hearings long after 
the jury selections and trials in such cases." [d. 
321. See id. 
322. See Stanley, 85 Md. App. at 99-100, 582 A.2d at 535. 
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
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tions in Jones v. State.325 Here, the court of appeals expressly recog-
nized that the remedy for Batson violations was an issue that the Bat-
son Court had left unresolved.326 Agreeing with the court of special 
appeals, the Jones court held that the determination of the appropri-
ate remedy for a Batson violation lies with the trial court.327 Accord-
ing to Jones, the trial court haS discretion to fashion a remedy that 
addresses and resolves the specific harm.328 
In Jones, the trial court found that the defense attorney's per-
emptory challenges of five white venirepersons were discrimina-
tory.329 Upon inquiry, the court concluded that the defense coun-
sel's explanations were "pure, simple subterfuge."33o To remedy the 
violation, the trial court reseated the seven stricken jurors.33l On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that instead of res eating the stricken ju-
rors, the trial court should have dismissed the entire panel and 
started the selection process over again with a new venire.332 In re-
sponse, the State argued that reseating improperly stricken jurors 
should be the sole remedy for Batson violations.333 Adopting the 
method used by the majority of state courts, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland delegated the determination of the appropriate remedy 
to the trial court. 334 
In its analysis, the court indicated that after a Batson violation is 
established, the goal of the trial court should be to effectuate a 
remedy that will balance the equal protection rights of the litigants 
and the challenged juror.335 The court stated that although there is 
no specific remedy, the facts and circumstances of each particular 
325. 343 Md. 584, 683 A.2d 520 (1996). 
326. See id. at 586, 683 A.2d at 521. 
327. See id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529. The court of appeals observed that a Batson 
violation may be "remedied by the discharge of the entire venire and begin-
ning jury selection anew with a new venire or by the reseating of the improp-
erly stricken juror." Id. at 594, 683 A.2d at 525. 
328. See id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529. 
329. See id. at 588-89, 683 A.2d at 522. 
330. Id. at 588, 683 A.2d at 522. 
331. See id. at 589, 683 A.2d at 522. The trial court recalled not only the five white 
jurors who had been improperly stricken, but two jurors who had been prop-
erly stricken by the prosecution. See id. 
332. See id. at 591, 683 A.2d at 523 (noting that the petitioner argued that reseated 
jurors were "biased against him for having attempted to remove them from 
the venire, [and that] reseating the jurors significantly prejudiced him, in vio-
lation of his [Fifth] Amendment right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury"). 
333. See id. at 591-92, 683 A.2d at 524. 
334. See id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529. 
335. See id. at 599, 683 A.2d at 527. 
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case are important considerations in fashioning a remedy.336 There-
fore, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate these consid-
erations and choose a remedy that balances the rights of all parties 
concerned.337 Although the court of appeals limited its discussion to 
the remedies of reseating the excluded juror or impaneling a new 
venire,338 Jones does not appear to limit a trial court's ability to for-
mulate a creative remedy.339 
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court in Jones 
made the appropriate decision because the Batson inquiry was not 
conducted in the presence of the jury.340 However, where the cir-
cumstances show that the reseated juror will harbor prejudice 
against the side that impermissibly exercised the peremptory strike, 
the court held that the only "viable effective remedy" is the dismis-
sal of the entire venire.341 To do otherwise would be an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion.342 
VI. ANALYSIS 
Practically speaking, an attorney must always be prepared to 
challenge the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by op-
posing counsel. In addition, attorneys must also be prepared to de-
fend their peremptory challenges in the face of charges that they 
were exercised in a discriminatory manner. To be effective, an attor-
ney should be prepared to present the court with all of the circum-
stances surrounding the acceptance or rejection of each individual 
juror. 
Consequently, the attorney should take meticulous notes dur-
ing the jury selection process. These notes should include informa-
tion regarding the characteristics of the jury pool by identifying 
males, females, and minorities. The attorney's notes should also re-
336. SI'£ id. at 602, 683 A.2d at 529. Factors to be considered include a defendant's 
constitutional right to a non-discriminatory jury and a juror's right not to be 
excluded because of race. See id. 
337. See id. 
338. SI'£ id. at 601, 683 A.2d at 528. 
339. See id. at 602, 683 A.2d at 529 (finding that conflicting constitutional rights be-
tween the defendant and the excluded juror "militates in favor of permitting 
the trial court to tailor the remedy so as to protect the rights of all parties 
concerned"). 
340. See id. at 603, 683 A.2d at 529 (noting that there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that the jurors were aware of the basis of their exclusion, or that it 
was unconstitutional). 
341. [d. at 604-05, 683 A.2d at 530. 
342. See id. 
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flect each juror's response to the voir dire questions. The attorney 
should also maintain a record of each juror stricken, the factors re-
lating to the strike, and a record for each juror remaining in the 
pool. 
Theoretically, an attorney familiar with the various cases inter-
preting Batson will be prepared to take the appropriate action when 
challenging or defending a peremptory strike. However, twelve years 
after the Batson decision, attorneys and courts are still struggling to 
understand when and how a Batson challenge should be made. No 
clear-cut or bright-line rules have evolved from Batson or its prog-
eny. To determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination has 
been established and whether a facially neutral reason for the chal-
lenge has been provided, courts must weigh the particular circum-
stances of each case.343 However, circumstances and individual 
judges can vary widely from one case to another. Thus, it is virtually 
impossible to determine the outcome of any given Batson challenge. 
Despite the confusion, many commentators recognize the need 
to prohibit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.344 How-
ever, views as to how to resolve the confusion vary. One proposal in-
volves the use of affirmative peremptory choices as opposed to per-
emptory strikes. 345 Rather than excluding jurors, affirmative 
peremptory choices would be used to include particular jurors.346 
Such choices could be race-based. 347 However, this proposal seems 
counterproductive if the goal is to eliminate race and gender crite-
ria from the jury selection process. Others advocate the total elimi-
nation of peremptory challenges.348 In the absence of peremptory 
343. See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text. 
345. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1114 (describing a proposal by Professor 
Deborah Ramirez to use affirmative peremptory choices to increase the odds 
of securing minority representation on a jury); see also Anderson, supra note 
209, at 392 (proposing an "affirmative selection" procedure in which defend-
ants trade some of their peremptory challenges for jurors that they believe 
will be favorable). 
346. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1114. The affirmative choices would be made 
after all challenges for cause had been exercised. See id. 
347. See id. 
348. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-08 (1986) (Marshall, j., concurring). As 
noted by Justice Marshall: "The decision today will not end the racial discrimi~ 
nation that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can 
be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely." [d. at 
102-03 (Marshall, j., concurring). 
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challenges, the trial court would have to validate every challenge.349 
Arguably, this would allow a judge to seat a juror that is objectiona-
ble to both parties.350 However, if an expanded challenge for cause 
system is adopted351 and properly administered, the parties could 
exclude any juror where there is good reason for the exclusion.352 
Other proposals offered by legal scholars address the need for 
deterrents against discriminatory peremptory challenges.353 These 
proposals include application of an exclusionary rule when the 
prosecutor uses a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory man-
ner354 and implementation of ethical rules to sanction practitioners 
using peremptories discriminatorily.355 While the need to deter dis-
crimination is valid, sanctions are worthless if discrimination cannot 
be proven to the satisfaction of the judge. In Batson, Justice Mar-
shall expressed his concern regarding the difficulties associated with 
establishing a prima facie case and determining prosecutorial mo-
tives.356 These difficulties remain despite the countless attempts by 
state and federal courts to interpret and apply Batson standards. 
However, courts could adopt rules that describe the specific 
types of nondiscriminatory reasons that will survive a Batson chal-
lenge.357 Statutory limitations on acceptable explanations could also 
349. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1134 (indicating that a judge's "willingness to 
give defense lawyers greater latitude in using for-cause strikes" would be cru-
cial to protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial). If there were no peremp-
tory challenges, the means to eliminate undesirable jurors would be primarily 
limited to challenges for cause. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
350. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1140. 
351. See id. at 1134 (suggesting the adoption of an "expanded for cause" system in 
which the trial judge could accept challenges on any basis that would lead a 
reasonable attorney to believe that the potential juror could not be impar-
tial) . 
352. See id. at 1140. 
353. See id. at 1116-23 (discussing proposed disincentives and penalties for discrimi-
nation in the jury selection process). 
354. See id. at 1117 (proposing that criminal proceedings be dismissed with 
prejudice if a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fash-
ion). 
355. See id. at 1116-17. 
356. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 1O.s.D6 (1986) (acknowledging that the use 
of discriminatory challenges must be "flagrant" to establish a prima facie case, 
and explaining that a prosecutor's motives may be hidden behind facially neu-
tral reasons and unconscioUs racism). 
357. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1124. Several court-imposed rules have been 
proposed. According to one commentator, courts should reject reasons like 
demeanor and intuitive impressions, require that all explanations be based on 
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be adopted.358 Arguably, the wide variety of potential circumstances 
suggests an almost infinite set of rules or limitations. Unless the 
rules or limitations address every conceivable explanation, some 
valid explanations could be rejected. Yet, it is possible to develop 
standards that would balance the types of acceptable reasons with 
guidelines for determining purely pretextual rationalizations. Thus, 
the appropriate standards must provide the trial judge with the nec-
essary tools for evaluating Batson challenges without totally eliminat-
ing the trial judge's discretion. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Many' would hail Batson as a pivotal decision that helped to 
eradicate discrimination from the jury selection process.359 Mter Bat-
son, an attorney could no longer exclude jurors of identifiable clas-
ses or groups without challenge.360 However, with the evolution of 
Batson, the peremptory challenge has become less discretionary. 
Some bemoan this weakening of the peremptory challenge, arguing 
that there is insufficient time and freedom for attorneys to question 
potential jurors or transcend superficial groupings and claSsifica-
tions.361 Even when an attorney is allowed to conduct extensive voir 
dire, the resulting information is often insufficient for the attorney 
to make more than an intuitive decision.362 
Unfortunately, these intuitive decisions have often resulted in 
discriminatory practices.363 There is a tendency to rely on negative 
stereotypes unless they are dispelled by body language or a verbal 
exchange.364 The cost of relying on negative stereotypes is discrimi-
the juror's voir dire statements or responses to a questionnaire, and require 
attorneys to strike all jurors that share some undesirable characteristic. See id. 
358. See id. 
359. See Ogletree, supra note 99, at 1101 (maintaining that Batson reduced the bur-
den of proof that a defendant needed to establish a discriminatory use of a 
peremptory challenge); Richers-Rowland, supra note 8, at 1195 (noting that 
prior to Batson, a defendant had to demonstrate a systematic pattern of ex-
cluding jurors because of race). 
360. See HAYDOCK & SoNSfENG, supra note 4, § 1.35, at 24-25. 
361. See Bill K. Felty, Resting in Mid-Air, the Supreme Court Strikes the Traditional Per-
emptury Challenge and Creates a New Creature, the Challenge fur Semi-Cause: Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 27 TULSA LJ. 203, 221 (1991) (concluding that if 
more time were allowed for attorneys to question potential jurors up front, 
the likelihood of error and appeal would ultimately be reduced). 
362. See id. at 222-23 (noting that even with intensive questioning, a negative stere-
otype may nonetheless be the basis for a peremptory challenge). 
363. See id.; see also supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. 
364. See Felty, supra note 361, at 223; see also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying 
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nation in the use of peremptory challenges.365 
The Supreme Court has determined that this cost is too high.366 
The courtroom is not the appropriate place for stereotypes and dis-
crimination. When a jury is chosen by discriminatory means, crimi-
nal defendants and civil litigants will find it difficult to accept its 
verdict because they lose confidence in the system's ability to render 
"color-blind" justice.367 
Batson may also be viewed as a single step toward the total elim-
ination of peremptory challenges.368 In Batson, the Supreme Court 
gave us the goal of eliminating peremptory challenges based on ste-
reotypes associated with cognizable groups.369 However, the Su-
preme Court did not tell us how to achieve that goaJ.370 Subsequent 
decisions rendered by state and federal courts37I have added struc-
ture to the foundation laid by Strauder372 and Batson.373 Unfortu-
nately, these decisions have yet to create a stable structure upon 
which an attorney can formulate or defend against a Batson 
challenge.374 
The ultimate goal is to establish a fair and impartial judicial sys-
tem. A clear mandate against discrimination in the courtroom must 
be a fundamental part of that system. Skin color and gender cannot 
be determinants in the jury selection process. Attorneys must find 
other means to ensure jury impartiality.375 Therefore, we will con-
tinue to struggle with Batson until our goal is reached. 
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text. 
365. See Felty, supra note 361, at 223 (explaining that if voir dire works as it should, 
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375. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (maintain-
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bias at issue). 
